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Domain and Forum: Public Space, Public Freedom 
Rebecca Tushnet* 
INTRODUCTION: ANALOGIZING COPYRIGHT'S PUBLIC DOMAIN TO 
A PUBLIC FORUM 
Many copyright doctrines, whether or not they are good ideas, do not fit well 
into conventional First Amendment jurisprudence. 1 Fair use, for example, overlaps 
with some First Amendment considerations but not others, and copying (infringing 
or not) can serve many important free speech interests.2 Examples of copying that 
fit well within traditional conceptions of First Amendment-protected speech are not 
hard to find. The New York Times recently reported on Chinese fans of American 
TV shows who download them using Bittorrent and similar programs, quickly 
create Chinese subtitles, and make them available to Chinese audiences who 
otherwise would not get to see them at all or would only see heavily censored 
versions.3 Their actions underscore the politically disruptive potential of art, as 
well as of copying, by bringing new ideas to people against the will of their 
governments. Copying also serves as a means of self-expression, as people identify 
with particular songs, stories or TV shows that they use to define themselves and to 
• Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Mark Tushnet and 
participants at Columbia Law School's symposium on Constitutional Challenges to Copyright. 
I. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in 
Common with Anti-Pornography Laws. Campaign Finance Reform. and Telecommunications 
Regulation, 42 B.c. L. REV. I (2001). 
2. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How 
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.1. 535 (2004). 
3. See Howard W. French, Chinese Tech Buffi Slake Thirstfor u.s. TV Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
9, 2006, at A6. American fans of Japanese anime and manga have for many years undertaken similar 
translation projects for works unavailable in English. See Jordan Hatcher, Of Otakus and Fansubs: A 
Critical Look at Anime Online in Light of Current Issues in Copyright Law, 2 SCRIPT-ED 514 (2005); 
Sean Kirkpatrick, Like Holding a Bird: What the Prevalence of Fansubbing Can Teach Us About the 
Use of Strategic Selective Copyright Enforcement, 21 TEMPLE ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 131 (2003); Sean 
Leonard, Celebrating Two Decades of Unlawful Progress: Fan Distribution. Proselytization Commons. 
and the Explosive Growth of Japanese Animation, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189 (2005). Although the 
directly political nature of these projects is less obvious, the ways in which this copying enables 
Japanese culture to affect English-speaking culture-especially the ways in which cultural interactions 
are driven by English speakers' demand rather than pushed by corporate decisions-would also be 
relevant to most theories of free speech. Cf Karla S. Lambert, Note, Unflagging Television Piracy: 
How Piracy of Japanese Television Programming in East Asia Portends Failure for A u.s. Broadcast 
Flag, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2006) (discussing the powerful cultural effects of unauthorized copies of 
Japanese content in other East Asian countries). 
597 
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explain themselves to others.4 And copying can serve as a means of directly 
persuasive argument: By selecting particularly well-argued or convincing works-
whether newspaper editorials, horrifying images or devastating comedy routines 
with a political slant--copiers can promote their own views far better than they 
could with more pallid, non copied imitations.5 
If it is the case that, at least sometimes, copying can be part of the freedom of 
speech with which the First Amendment is concerned, how should we think about 
the relationship between copyright and the First Amendment? Many answers have 
been proposed to that question, and I will not here attempt a comprehensive 
assessment of the debate. Rather, my discussion will examine the similarities and 
divergences between copyright and First Amendment principles using two points of 
comparison: the public forum and the public domain. A "public forum" in First 
Amendment law is a place held in trust by the government for use by the people, 
whether generally (a traditional public forum) or for specific topics (a limited 
public forum). By "public domain," I refer to various concepts of freedom to use 
expression, information and other intangible intellectual goods, rather than to real 
property. The public forum and the public domain are places that belong to 
everyone, because they belong to no one, from which people cannot be excluded on 
the grounds that a property owner wishes to exclude them.6 
In this discussion, it may be helpful to distinguish between constitutional 
mandates and constitutional values. Or, another way to put it (with somewhat 
different implications), there are constitutional standards enforceable by courts and 
constitutional decisions committed to legislatures, and legislatures have a duty to 
consider constitutional principles when making law, even when no court will 
4. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 568-74; Howard Parnell, Downloading Empathy to Your iPod: 
Online Playlist Creators Search for Catharsis. Discover a Marketplace, WASH. POST, Mar. I, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynicontentiarticle/2006/03/01/AR2006030100635.html 
(discussing people who create iTunes playlists of songs to express their grief over losing a loved one, 
which both helps them and creates links with other people who listen to the playlists); John Wenzel, 
That Special Ring, DENVER POST, July 10, 2006, at F-OI(discussing cellphone ringtones as self-
expression). 
5. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 574-78; Linda R. Hirshman, Unleashing the Wrath of Stay-at-
Home Moms, WASH. POST, June 18, 2006, at BOI (arguing that many women had privately copied and 
emailed her article in The American Prospect to each other to articulate and defend their own beliefs). 
A slightly different example comes from Mark Tushnet's selection of Justice Douglas's concurrence in 
Roe v. Wade as his contribution to the book What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said, an edited volume 
designed to give prominent constitutional scholars a chance to write their own, improved opinions in the 
case. By selecting Douglas's words and arguments, Tushnet makes the claim that the Justices then did 
the best they could have done, being who they were and living when they were. In a sense, he argues 
against the book's project from within. David J. Garrow's review of the book treats Tushnet's 
contribution as a valuable part of the collection; it makes an argument that no other, noncopied piece 
could make as plainly. See David J. Garrow, Roe v. Wade Revisited: Balkin's What Roe v. Wade 
Should Have Said, THE GREEN BAG, Aug. 2005. 
6. The extent to which the "public domain" is a place at all is contestable. Place is a metaphor, 
and maybe a misleading one. Julie Cohen has urged copyright scholars to think of people moving 
through "cultural landscapes," in which private and partially private content mingles with public domain 
material in unpredictable, creative, and productive ways. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright. 
Commodification and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
121-66 (L. Guibault & P.B. Hugenholtz eds., 2006). 
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intervene if they fail. First Amendment public forum doctrine is a useful place to 
look for insights, because, like copyright's speech-promotion function, its practical 
utility to speakers is largely committed to legislative discretion. The Constitution 
does not require creation of public forums any more than it requires the enactment 
of a copyright law or a fifty-six year copyright term. 7 But public forums 
nonetheless have been a vital part of the structure of free speech. 
When the legislature does decide to create a public forum, First Amendment 
doctrine makes clear that the power to create is not equivalent to the power to 
structure in any possible way. If a public park exists, the government cannot let a 
commissioner decide who can speak or preach there. If there is a fund for student 
publications at a public university, the university cannot refuse to fund 
controversial student publications. Notably, in the student-fund case, the Supreme 
Court recognized a "metaphysical" or intangible public forum,s making an even 
closer connection to the metaphorical space of the public domain of facts, ideas and 
other intangibles not protected by copyright. 
The particular problems of content and viewpoint discrimination rarely surface 
in copyright, though some people have argued that fair use implicates them. 
Nonetheless, one important lesson for copyright from public forum doctrine is that 
First Amendment law can take some-though not many-speech-related options 
off the table. In this brief comment, I argue that analogies between copyright law 
and public forum doctrine highlight important shared commitments to free and 
robust public discourse, but also substantial practical barriers to judicial 
enforcement of those commitments. 
I. PUBLIC FORUMS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: PARALLEL 
LIMITS 
Problems theorizing and defining public domains are similar to problems 
theorizing and defining public forums. These similarities show up in various 
features of doctrine and conceptions of the public domain. The parallels also 
7. But cf Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 TuL. 
L. REV. 163, 197-98 & nn.184-86 (2002) (arguing that governments are obligated to create public 
forums on public property and citing other sources making similar claims). The idea that government 
must preserve some of its property for use as a public forum, and even that it must position its public 
forums to maximize the effectiveness of citizen speech, is analytically distinct from the more aggressive 
claim that government must regulate private property to provide citizens effective access to each other. 
In theory-and as public forum doctrine has developed-the government's obligations with respect to 
its own property can require attention to the practical consequences for speech, even while no such 
analysis is required when the government allows private property owners full exclusion rights. In other 
words, public forum doctrine may require that, for any given set of government properties, the use of 
those properties must maximize opportunities for citizens to speak, but it has nothing to say about how 
much property government must regulate. If people refuse to come to the government's well-
maintained public spaces because they are too happy at home or at the mall, there is no further 
obligation. See infra notes 19,25 and accompanying text. 
8. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (finding that a public 
university's student activities fund was a "forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic 
sense, but the same principles are applicable"). 
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suggest that a robust theory of the public domain, which many low-protectionists 
have called for as part of the affirmative case for limiting copyright expansionism, 
may be difficult to develop, especially in the courts. 
A persistent tension in First Amendment public forum doctrine is that the 
doctrine regulates government behavior with respect to areas the government is not 
constitutionally required to maintain. That government chooses to preserve and 
create public forums, both traditional and limited, indicates the existence of free 
speech values that go beyond First Amendment rules protecting against 
government suppression. It is to these free speech values, more than to First 
Amendment rights against the government as such, that public domain advocates in 
copyright also appeal. Thus, the constitutional public domain-that which the 
government may not seal off using copyright or copyright-like laws-is only one 
component of the full complement of public domains. Indeed, the constitutional 
public domain is only one of thirteen overlapping types of public domains 
identified by Pamela Samuelson in her discussion of the varieties of the public 
domain in intellectual property literature.9 
Once it exists, the public domain is a space, like a public forum, where anyone 
can speak without paying for placement. That lack of control is what makes public 
forums legally different from privately owned television stations, and Shakespeare 
legally different from Stoppard. The public forum doctrine's aspiration is to place 
a limit ~n the claim that freedom of the press is limited to those who own one. 
Public forums allow speech supporting the "poorly financed causes of little 
people,,10 to be disseminated where it is likely to be heard, in public spaces where 
the public often goes. Justice Fortas's statement· in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District is a classic formulation of this position: 
Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be so 
circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of expression would 
not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent 
government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots. I I 
Despite Justice Fortas's broad claims, public forum doctrine has been held 
hostage to history. Only traditional public forums, like parks and streets, get the 
. full protection of the First Amendment. Newer sites of communication, from 
shopping malls to the internet, are free from the constraints imposed on the 
traditional public forum. Moreover, as long as the government does not 
9. Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.1. 783, 792-94 (2006). 
As Samuelson points out, conceptions of the public domain cluster around three core concepts: "( I) the 
legal status of information resources; (2) freedoms to use information resources, even if protected by 
intellectual property (lP) rights; and (3) accessibility of information resources." Id. at 785. Freedom of 
use and accessibility are values that both traditional and designated public forums further, even when 
their provision is conditional on policy judgments that such freedom and openness is in the public 
interest. Recognizing multiple concepts of the public domain can, as Samuelson says, illuminate "a 
range of important social values served by these domains and a plethora of strategies for preserving 
them and the values they serve." Id. at 786. 
10. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
II. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
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discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, most forums maintained by the government 
can be limited and manipulated to exclude undesired content. 12 
Relatedly, any particular public forum can be closed for non-speech-related 
reasons. If the government decides that the public interest will be better served by 
selling a park to a logging company, or by turning a park into a sports stadium, the 
First Amendment offers no grounds for objection. Similar dynamics are also at 
work in copyright. Material in the public domain can be turned into private 
property by non-copyright means such as contracts, digital rights management 
technologies, and even trespass claims.13 Fair use is no defense. This may well be 
a mistake, but it is a mistake that First Amendment doctrine has allowed 
legislatures to make with physical property as well as with intellectual property. 
If Justice Fortas was correct that free speech must exist in fact as well as in 
principle, the implications are profound. The public forum and the public domain 
are not just matters of government choice, but of social structure. If we live in 
gated communities, using Zune players that apply digital rights management 
(DRM) controls to every piece of music, the theoretical availability of the public 
forum and the public domain will not affect a speaker's actual ability to reach 
audiences. 
The issue that then arises is whether the public forum doctrine exists to 
implement an underlying principle about the ability of poorly financed speakers to 
reach willing listeners, or whether it is merely an artifact of government property 
ownership. If it is the latter, the fact that public forums disappear is of no concern 
to freedom of speech. In other words, why would we care about a speaker's 
inability to reach listeners on public property? If the speaker has sufficient 
resources, she can buy airtime on private television channels, or mail out flyers, or 
set up a website. As long as the government does not bar her from doing any of 
those things, it has not prevented her from disseminating her message. 14 She might 
want to use a public park to speak, but she might also want to use a private doctor's 
office, and in the latter case the property owner could throw her out regardless of 
the value of her speech to democracy. 
If we truly believe that every speaker ought to have a chance to reach other 
people, even without the ability to finance dissemination of that speech, there 
would be a constitutional problem if the government shut down all public parks. 
Further, if audiences are no longer readily available at public parks, the same 
interest in reaching audiences could justify overriding even private property rights. 
The Supreme Court has never been willing to take the argument that far. Federal 
courts have to date refused to recognize speech interests in speaking on truly 
12. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations oj Speech and 
Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 921 (1993). 
13. See. e.g., Christine D. Galbraith, Remembering the Public Domain, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 135 
(2006) (discussing these transitions into private control). 
14. If the government discriminates on its property based on the viewpoint of the speaker, that 
creates special problems. But I am here assuming a flat ban on speeches, which would not have obvious 
viewpoint-based motives or effects. Public forum doctrine invalidates the flat ban in a traditional public 
forum as well as viewpoint discrimination. 
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private property, on the theory that the property owner can decide on what tenns 
access will be grantedY 
Nor is it likely that courts will decide that the First Amendment requires limits 
on copyright on the grounds that freedom of speech in practice requires some 
freedom of copying. Instead, they are likely to leave such judgments to the 
legislature, confident that non-copying means of expression remain theoretically 
available. 16 Larry Lessig sounds the alann about copyright's public domain. His 
concerns correspond to structurally identical worries about the declining role of 
physical public places in American life and the resulting effects on our democracy: 
There is a public domain, but it is small, relative to its history, and it is shrinking. 
Digital technology will only speed its decline. And because most are oblivious to the 
particular threat that digital technolo~ poses for the public domain, the prospects for 
reversing this trend are not promising. 7 
Using similar language, First Amendment theorists criticize public forum doctrine 
because it is defining itself into irrelevance: "[E]xisting public forum doctrine is 
inadequate ... because it limits the key reference point of the traditional public 
forum to antiquated public spaces that have a decreasing impact on the everyday 
communicative lives of modern citizens.,,18 
Both public forum doctrine and copyright have allowed the slow squeezing out 
of a speaker's practical freedom even as the law insists her rights are unchanged. 
For example, there has historically been a difference between ownership of a copy 
and ownership of the copyright in the work embodied in a copy. When property 
rights are divided in such a way, copy owners have freedom to transfer, and 
substantial freedom to modifY, 19 their copies. The concentration of property rights 
in a single private owner, as in a licensing model, removes those abilities. When 
people no longer congregate in public spaces but are more readily available in 
malls, property owners can more readily control what speech large groups of 
people see and hear. When copies are licensed and combined with DRM, the same 
phenomenon occurs. A copyright owner's fonner inability to control certain uses 
of its works seems merely an artifact of social arrangements and technological 
IS. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). State constitutions, however, can grant such 
free speech rights without violating federal constitutional protection for property rights. See Prune Yard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
16. Cf Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,221 (2003) (holding that the First Amendment "bears 
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches," assuming that substitutes 
are readily available). 
17. Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56, 56 (2006). 
18. Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1535, 1634 (1998); see also, e.g., CASS SUN STEIN, REpUBLlC.COM 5-15 (2001) (arguing that new 
communications technologies make it even easier for people to isolate themselves from the public forum 
and engage only with self-selected points of view, to the detriment of democracy and First Amendment 
values); id. at 53-54 (positing that the decline of physical public forums, which force people to confront 
unanticipated situations and viewpoints, will increase polarization and decrease tolerance for diversity). 
19. Taking notes in books or highlighting passages in casebooks, for example, are activities that 
alter a specific copy, but probably don't infringe the derivative works right even in theory; in practice, 
these actions are not within copyright owners' control. 
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development. Although digital copies could open up new possibilities for cheap, 
easy excerpting, such as for educational uses, prevailing doctrine treats digital 
media, even when it's digitized analog content, as nontraditional. Thus, the 
allocation of control between copyright owners and audiences can be entirely 
different from that for analog media, without implicating constitutional 
considerations that would apply were copyright owners given similar control over 
analog versions.2o 
Nonetheless, it remains optional for the government to adopt, as good free 
speech policy, generous exceptions to copyright, just as states may treat private 
property, like shopping malls, as places where free speech must be allowed.21 The 
major success of copyright restrictionists along this line has been "transformative" 
fair use, which courts have accepted as necessary for practical freedom of speech 
when a copyrighted work is an important piece of common culture. Like a 
shopping mall, Gone with the Wind is part of our collective experience, even 
though it is also a private possession used to generate revenue.22 Allowing 
unauthorized speech "on" the copyright owner's private property is a way of 
recognizing that practical significance, as the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in a 
shopping mall case: 
If free speech is to mean anything in the future, it must be exercised at these centers. 
Our constitutional right encompasses more than leafleting and associated speech on 
sidewalks located in empty downtown business districts. It means communicating 
with the people in the new commercial and social centers; if the people have left for 
the shopping centers, our constitutional right includes the right to go there too, to 
follow them, and to talk to them. We do not believe that those who adopted a 
constitutional provision granting a right of free speech wanted it to diminish in 
importance as society changed, to be dependent on the unrelated accidents of 
economic transformation, or to be silenced because of a new way of doing business.23 
In the public forum context, however, this interpretation of the affirmative right 
to free speech remains an option for state constitutional law, rather than a federal 
requirement. Indeed, most states have elected to follow the federal rule that free 
20. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). Cf Berkman Center 
for Internet & Society White Paper, Digital Learning Case Study: Film Studies and the Law of the DVD, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edulhome/dl_filmstudies (Aug. 2006) (discussing film professors' use of 
circumvention tools to create teaching resources incorporating clips from DVDs and the special legal 
problems of using DVDs, as opposed to videotapes). 
21. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (\ 980). 
22. State courts following this line of reasoning have noted that the private property owner 
generally seeks public entrance and participation, which decreases any asserted interest in maintaining 
total control. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 244 (Wash. 
1981) ("When property is open to the public, the owner has a reduced expectation of privacy and, as a 
corollary, any speech activity is less threatening to the property's value."). Federal courts finding fair 
use have drawn parallel conclusions about the scope of fair use for published works, with which the 
public has been encouraged to become familiar. See, e.g., Arica Inst. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1078 
(2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that the plaintiffs work was "published work available to the general public," 
which favored the fair use defense). 
23. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 
779 (N.J. 1994). 
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speech rights do not extend to private property, no matter how public a function 
that private property serves.24 
Proponents of a robust public domain are thus returning to arguments about the 
practicalities of promoting speech that have rarely had much traction in the courts. 
For example, Julie Cohen's theory of cultural landscapes argues for freedom for 
people to play with the cultural materials they encounter, whether those materials 
are copyrighted or not. If the public domain is, as Cohen says, "everywhere the 
public is," then chat rooms are public space no less than public parks, and private 
parties' contractual and property rights to control those chat rooms may be 
limited.25 
Likewise, Michael Birnhack's concept of the public domain as enabler of 
deliberative democracy bears strong resemblances to descriptions of the public 
forum in First Amendment law. Both the First Amendment and the public domain, 
he argues, "construct, or aim at constructing, a communicative sphere, where 
people can interact with each other in various circles, whether it is an interpersonal 
circle, a communitarian one or a wider political circle. In this sense, both the public 
domain and the idea of freedom of speech stem from the same source.,,26 Birnhack 
is writing about public forum values, not general First Amendment values. The 
difficulty with his aspirational account is that public forum doctrine leaves much 
property that can be privatized and set off limits from deliberative democratic 
interaction. 
Calls for expansion of the public domain and public forums, in both cases, often 
include proposals to require nondiscriminatory access to the private resources-
whether communications channels, physical spaces or intellectual property-that 
have taken the place of public resources.27 Lessig, for example, argues that the 
principles of free access he defends can be promoted by content- and viewpoint-
neutral rules, even if some payment is required, as long as no potentially censorious 
24. See Sarah G. Vincent, The Cultural Context of the Shopping Mall: Tension Between Patron's 
Right of Access and Owner's Right to Exclude, 37 UWLA L. REv. 221,248-53 (2004) (surveying state 
case law). 
25. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 157; see also Julie Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright 
Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 21, available at SSRN: 
http://ssm.comlabstract=929527). 
26. Michael Bimhack, More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF 
INFORMATION, (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5, available at SSRN: http://ssm.comlabstract=67730I). 
Birnhack writes: 
[Bloth copyright law and free speech jurisprudence aim at a rich and diverse public domain, in 
which deliberation can take place without any impediments, in which all who wish can 
participate, regardless of their market power. It is a public domain which is interested in the 
exchange between the multiple voices and their expressions, which realizes that new ideas form 
when old ideas interact. In other words, this is a public domain that rejects cultural control which 
is executed through the use of property rights .... 
[d. (manuscript at 34). Bimhack is trying to push First Amendment theory in the direction of 
recognizing more affirmative rights for speakers as well as articulating a defense of the public domain 
against copyright ownership. Right now, most of the ways in which one can disseminate speech do 
require money and "market power" to succeed. 
27. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 154-57. 
HeinOnline -- 30 Colum. J.L. & Arts 605 2006-2007
2007] DOMAIN AND FORUM 605 
human will is imposed between a speaker and her audience.28 Likewise, First 
Amendment reformers argue that some property owners, such as shopping mall 
owners, should be required to allow other speakers physical access to their 
property, because nondiscriminatory access serves the same function in a heavily 
propertized society as access to a public forum. 29 
Fundamentally, the existence of a public forum implements a constitutional 
norm of speakers' access to audiences even if no court can require a legislature to 
establish such a public space. Given this norm, it should be at least within the 
legislature's discretion to decide that private property has to give way to free 
speech in malls, if that is an effective way for speakers to connect to audiences. 
Likewise, the claim that copyrights are private property cannot be dispositive in 
determining whether there is a free speech right to copy in certain circumstances, 
when it serves the goal of informing the public or creating common ground. The 
next section addresses the idea of "property" as trump more specifically, and then 
discusses several ways in which public forum doctrine has set baselines defining 
when certain types of property can be used to control speech. 
II. SOME SPECULATIONS ABOUT FORUMS AND DOMAINS 
A. THE ROLE OF "PROPERTY" IN RESOLVING FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEMS 
In the first half of the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court initially 
addressed suppression of speech in the public sphere, the Court treated public 
property as, in essence, the private property of the government, meaning that there 
was no problem if the government suppressed speech based on its viewpoint. "The 
complex and difficult problem of the public forum had been 'solved' by resort to 
common law concepts of private property.,,30 The Supreme Court later began to 
recognize that government discrimination against particular types of speech in 
public forums was a pernicious method of silencing unpopular and oppositional 
speakers, and developed tests that made it much more difficult for governments to 
do so.3! 
In the case of copyright, appeals to the idea that copyrights are private property 
just like printing presses, have also come under increasing pressure-where public 
forum doctrine ultimately recognized that government property is different, many 
copyright scholars have maintained that intangible property is different.32 The 
28. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 17, at 57-58. 
29. See, e.g., SUNSTE!N, supra note 18, at 26-28. (arguing that the First Amendment should be 
understood to create an affirmative right to access to people and places, justifying government 
regulation ofaccess to otherwise private property). 
30. Geoffrey Stone, Fora Americana, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 233, 237 (1974). 
31. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of 
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1724-39 (1987). 
32. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional 
Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 207-08 (2003); Laura R. 
Bradford, Parody And Perception: Using Cognitive Research To Expand Fair Use in Copyright, 46 s.c. 
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absence of a scarcity rationale for protecting the words that come off the printing 
press is of course relevant; perhaps more persuasive in a First Amendment analysis, 
however, is the proposition that the government cannot place expression off limits 
simply by declaring it to interfere with another person's intangible property 
interest.33 If the property label were enough to avoid constitutional infirmity, 
defamation (which can be conceived of as protecting a property interest in 
reputation), intentional infliction of emotional distress (which can be conceived of 
as protecting a property interest in peace of mind) and anti-flag-burning laws 
(which can be conceived of as protecting the government's property in the 
intangible qualities of the American flag34), among others, could all be excised 
from the scope of the First Amendment.35 
Public forum doctrine, to the extent that it rests on principles other than the 
simple tradition of allowing free speech in public places, depends on baseline rules 
defining property rights. Thus, the existence of a public forum can be described as 
a free speech "easement" for the public on government property.36 PruneYard 
allowed a state to design private property rules to create a free speech easement 
over certain private property as well. Rights to use copyrighted works can likewise 
be seen as easements-not unwarranted interferences, but areas of public freedom 
that interpenetrate private property. 
B. TRADITIONAL FORUMS, TRADITIONAL CONTOURS 
Because baselines are vital to determining whether property rights can trump 
speech, courts have been drawn to apparently objective standards, such as historical 
practice. To fit within public forum doctrine, a place must be either a "traditional" 
or a "designated" public forumY To be a traditional public forum, a place must 
have been "immemorially ... held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, . " used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
L. REv. 705, 719-20 (2005); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment 
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1,39 (2001). 
33. I mean "simply" seriously-it is of course possible, even likely, that the reasons justifying the 
use of the label "property" are sufficient to sustain prohibitions on certain kinds of copying, false and 
damaging statements, etc. But that is an analysis from within First Amendment law, asking whether the 
interests protected by the law are important enough and whether the law is well-tailored enough to 
justify suppressing speech. The copyright-as-printing-press argument, by contrast, purports to take 
copyright completely outside the scope of First Amendment coverage. See generally Frederick Schauer, 
The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, I 17 
HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). 
34. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh & Mark Lemley, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 182-83 (1998) (noting that a bill introduced in Congress would have 
declared the United States flag to be copyrighted and defined flag-burning and desecration as 
infringement). 
35. See Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment 
Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2445-46 (1998). 
36. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. 
REv. I, 13 (1965). 
37. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,802 (1985). 
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citizens, and discussing public questions. ,,38 The class of traditional public forums 
is fixed and never expands. Internet access, even in a public library, is a new 
means of communication and therefore not part of a public forum.39 
The role of tradition in defining the public domain got a boost from Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, which said that there was no First Amendment problem when Congress 
did not disrupt the "traditional contours" of copyright in expanding its protection.4o 
Anti-expansionists quickly seized on the negative implication: as government 
cannot close a park to communicative activity, it may be unable to expand 
copyright to eliminate fair use or protect ideas or facts.41 And this is true even 
though the works subject to fair use or the facts contained in copyrighted works 
may not have existed traditionally; it is the class of material, like the class of public 
parks, that must remain open for free use. If the analogy holds true, perhaps the 
Second Circuit was wrong to declare that there was no cognizable First 
Amendment interest in making fair use of a DVD as opposed to a videotape.42 The 
DVD may be a new "place," but the creative work it contains is the type of work to 
which fair use applies, just as a new public park is still a place to which the ancient 
right of free speech applies. 
History is never an answer in itself. It always requires interpretation and 
application to present cases. "Fighting words," for example, are words that are 
likely to cause immediate violence and have never been protected by the First 
Amendment.43 But yesterday'S fighting words, such as "damned Fascist,''''4 are 
extremely unlikely to start a brawl today, and therefore they are no longer beyond 
the scope of constitutional protection. Using a similar approach in which 
categories persist even as facts change, one way to give effect to Eldred's 
"traditional contours" could be to use old principles to require new freedoms. If 
social changes make new, nontraditional uses fair according to the traditional 
factors-for example time-shifting of home video recordings or search engine 
aggregation of content-then these new uses may be constitutionally protected, 
even though they were nonexistent at the Founding and in 1790 when the first 
Copyright Act was passed. 
The ideas of traditional forums and traditional contours offer courts some 
opportunities to define judicially enforceable boundaries of property rights. Most 
of the time, however, courts will likely remain reluctant to interfere with legislative 
38. In!' I Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
39. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194,205-06 (2003). 
40. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
41. Whether things like new rights such as public performance or the elimination of formalities 
disrupt the traditional contours of copyright is debatable, as others have noted. The public forum 
analogy may be unhelpful in determining this, because razing the park to create a prison serves 
government objectives unrelated to encouraging or discouraging expression, whereas copyright 





See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d CiT. 2001). 
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
See id. a/ 574. 
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allocations of rights. 
C. CAPTIVE AUDIENCES 
A final point of comparison between the public domain and the public forum is 
what speakers and audiences necessarily risk by participating in public life. What 
sort of negative experiences should we be expected to tolerate? Freedom of speech, 
in a public forum and elsewhere, can be limited out of a concem for "captive 
audiences," people who do not want to hear the speech at issue, but cannot easily 
escape it.45 In many situations, however, unwilling listeners are required to turn 
away and ignore the speech, because other willing listeners may be present.46 
Essentially, First Amendment doctrine requires a certain level of toughness from 
citizens when it comes to unwanted messages in public places, just as it does with 
respect to negative but non-defamatory speech and even non-negligent defamatory 
speech. This offers a potential lesson for the role of copyright in protecting 
authors' moral interests and sensibilities. If there is a justification for a use of a 
work-whether in a scathing book review or a biting parody-the undeniable harm 
to the original author may be, like the pain of the unwilling audience watching an 
offensive public parade, something that society expects its citizens to tolerate. 
It is probably no easier for authors to avoid reading reviews than for people in a 
public park to close their ears to an offensive speaker, but even if authors are 
captive in practice, their captivity is part of the social compact. We all encounter 
speech we do not like, speech that is deeply offensive to our sense of self and all 
that is right and just. Authors may be entitled to special rights in many 
circumstances, but the First Amendment's treatment of unwilling listeners suggests 
that authors' interests may not trump those of other, willing listeners. Of course 
this ties back into the property discussion above-an unwilling listener need not let 
a proselytizer into his house. But when the property is intangible, an author's 
prohibition of its critical use as part of a new work prevents the new work from 
reaching its willing audience. This is why the fair use is more like communication 
in the streets than like a forced entry into a house. 
One possible extrapolation from this principle of required toughness involves 
the importance of an individual's affirmative choice to avoid participating in 
dialogue. The First Amendment solicitation cases, in which proselytizers, 
advertisers, and the like sought to approach private property from the public street 
or through the public mails, resulted in the principle that unwilling recipients must 
affirmatively opt out by posting signs banning solicitation or informing the mailer 
that they do not wish to receive further communications. The existence of a 
potential opt-out as a default rule means that more speech-restrictive alternatives, 
such as total bans on solicitation or opt-in regimes, are unconstitutionally restrictive 
45. See Stone, supra note 30, at 262-66. 
46. See e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment barred 
the prosecution of a man for wearing an anti-war jacket stating "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse). 
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of speech.47 Potential audiences who are indifferent to receiving speech, or have 
not yet thought about it, have First Amendment interests in being exposed to that 
speech, and potential speakers have First Amendment interests in reaching these 
audiences. 
The analogy here is to massive aggregation projects like Google's web index 
and Google's library digitization project: especially if one believes that most 
authors who do not opt out are happy, or at least indifferent, to having their works 
indexed, Google's indexing may promote free speech values simply by fixing a 
default.48 As Wendy Gordon noted, "Shareable goods are a traditional source of 
binding groups together: not only standard 'public goods' such as highways and 
defense, but also folk tales, art, songs, and symphonies.'>49 In the absence of 
explicit individual signals that a property owner wishes to leave the public give-
and-take, perhaps we should keep her in by default. This is not to say that all opt-
outs must be honored-classic criticism and quotation would remain legitimate in 
copyright even without copyright owners' consent, just as negative opinions and 
damaging truthful statements about public figures remain legitimate in free speech 
law-but that default rules have an important role to play in structuring the 
communicative environment, because they have such profound effects on the 
overall amount of free speech. 
III. CONCLUSION 
From the perspective of copyright minimalism, the history of the public forum's 
place in First Amendment jurisprudence is a depressing one. Public forum doctrine 
has provided only the most minimal guarantee of payment-free speech. No 
constitutional rule requires that public forums be created, or that they be configured 
so they allow speakers to reach audiences, even though the cases speak in glowing 
terms about the democracy-sustaining functions of the public forum. Unless the 
defenders of the public domain can do a better job connecting theory and practice, 
the public domain may end up serving similar purposes: allowing private property 
owners to pay lip service to values of openness and equality, while justifying 
control and enforcing inequality every place it matters. Proponents of a robust 
public domain must remind legislators that they too affect the amount and 
distribution of free speech; courts cannot be left alone to defend the First 
Amendment. 
47. See Stone, supra note 30, at 265. 
48. See Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and 
the Many Faces of Property (September I, 2006), U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 
92, available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=931426. See also the opt-out for certain nonprofit 
musical performances in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2000). 
49. Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617, 644 
(Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003). 
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